Introduction
to explain patterns in population abundance. But ecologists also examine a third kind of system-experimental systems. How can lab work bear on observational techniques?
Cryptic Dynamics in Bottle Experiments
It is prima-facie plausible that ecological patterns underdetermine causes; several different mechanisms could generate the same population dynamics. This initial thought makes trouble for observational techniques which infer from observed patterns in natural systems to trophic interactions between populations. Could other interactions generate these patterns?
Imagine observing the following in an ecosystem: a predator population cycles, but prey remains constant. In this circumstance, observational techniques infer a weak trophic interaction between the two populations. As there are no changes in prey population, the cycling of predators must be independent; moreover, the prey population appears insensitive to predator number. However, imagine that the prey population contains two morphs, tough and soft.
Toughs are resistant to predators, and so do well in predator-rich environments. However, they are outcompeted by softs when predation pressure is low. In those circumstances, it is possible that total prey number remains roughly even, while the population oscillates between high tough/low soft (when predator population is high), and low tough/high soft (when it is low).
There are strong trophic links between predator and prey, but observational techniques predict weak interactions. This is an example of a cryptic population dynamic: the strength of the relevant trophic interactions are masked by rapid evolution in the prey population 7 oscillates. That is, the prey population remains steady while the predator population behaves as if in a regular predator-prey relationship (figure 1). We know that rotifers and algae have strong trophic interactions, but here they don't act like it:
Even though we know that the rotifers and algae are bound in a tight predator-prey relationship, a plot of their densities in a predator-prey phase plane suggests instead that rotifers and algal populations are completely decoupled. (1869) Yoshida et al suggest that cryptic dynamics due to hidden population structure could explain their results. They suggest that there are two kinds of algae, mapping onto tough and soft. The algae population remains stable because of compensation between the two morphs. If these dynamics occurred in natural systems, observational techniques would mistakenly infer weak trophic links.
Yoshida et al explore their hypothesis using a simple mathematical model, effectively a predator/prey equation where prey are split into two groups. That is, total prey abundance at a time is the sum of the value of two morphs. These differ along two variables: their 'palatability', or the probability of being preyed upon, and their birth rate. We can represent toughs and softs as follows: toughs have low palatability and a correspondingly low birthrate, softs high palatability and high birthrate. The model indeed generates the kinds of cryptic cycles observed in the rotifer-algae system, driven by density compensation.
[In the model] Prey evolution is driven by occasional predator outbreaks, but prey density remains nearly constant because the consumption of the vulnerable prey is almost exactly balanced by growth of the better-defended prey when they are released from competition with the vulnerable type (1871). Now consider a second experiment: a mixed population of algae competed without rotifer disruption for a significant period (12 days). When rotifers were introduced, the two populations briefly switched to standard predator/prey oscillations, before settling to a low, constant population of algae with cycling rotifers (figure 2). Yoshida et al again explain these results in reference to rapid evolution between morphs. In circumstances without predation, softs would predominate. Upon the introduction of rotifers, the relatively homogeneous prey population creates a standard predator-prey cycle. Once the proportion of toughs increases sufficiently, the cryptic rapid-evolution cycle commences. Again, this is borne out in the mathematical system. So, Yoshida et al posit an explanation for the behavior of the rotifer-algae system: that it is due to rapid evolution oscillating between tough and soft algae. Further, "… mathematical modeling demonstrates this is a plausible explanation" (1872). However, can we be sure that rapid evolution in fact occurs? Here, Yoshida et al turn to a different experimental system. This system consists of bacteria and phage (viruses which target bacteria). In this setup, two different bacterial clones are used, one susceptible to phage and another resistant. The latter group carries a marker which enables tracking the relative density of genotypes in the bacteria population. In an experiment which mimics the original rotifer-algae study,
The fraction of the susceptible genotype in the total bacteria population clearly showed evolutionary cycles in concert with cycles in bacteriophage density, as our model predicts (1872).
To summarize, we observe a phenomenon in the algae-rotifer system: apparently decoupled population dynamics in two populations we know to have strong trophic interactions. We then consider whether rapid evolution is to blame, constructing a simple model to represent and explore this hypothesis. The model predicts rapid evolution under highly simple circumstances.
Finally, we turn to another experimental surrogate-bacteria and phage-and confirm the same dynamics, but this time directly observing cycles in the cryptic prey population. This, it seems to me, provides persuasive evidence that rapid evolution occurred in the algaerotifer system. First, we know there is tight trophic coupling in the system; second, we know the prey population is mixed; third, plausibility is granted by two surrogates (the mathematical model and the bacteria-phage experiments) 5 . On this picture, Yoshida et al infer from one bottle to 5 On my view, the model's success in aping both the first and (more impressively) the second rotiferalgae experiments provide some epistemic grounds for the cryptic-dynamic explanation's plausibility. For another; triangulating between two experimental systems and a mathematical one. However, they don't frame their work as explaining an odd result in a bottle experiment. Instead, they tie their study to the observational techniques used to establish trophic interactions in natural systems:
The potential for the kind of cryptic dynamics that we have documented here means, however, that there are circumstances in which the absence of such statistical relationships cannot be reliably taken as evidence for the absence of important biological interactions (1874).
Further:
… efforts to establish the nature and strength of interactions in ecological communities that fail to consider the potential for evolution (which is to say virtually all efforts to date) run a risk of being incorrect. Because essentially all natural populations have heritable variation for ecologically important traits… ignoring the potential for evolution to affect measurements of species interactions becomes untenable (1874).
According to Yoshida et al, then, their experimental results matter because they lead us to question the application of observational techniques to natural systems-they are extrapolationists. In the next section, I first expand upon and then question this kind of view.
Extrapolationism
An extrapolationist defense of a scientific investigation turns on its role in generating propositional knowledge-truths-pertaining to natural systems. That is, for the extrapolationist the value of an investigation is primarily due to its confirmatory prowess: it provides grounds for belief in some hypothesis pertaining to natural systems. discussion of how under some conditions models can play confirmatory roles see Parke [2014] , Currie [2018] chapter 9.
In this section I'll characterize extrapolationism in the context of ecological bottle experiments, and highlight a vulnerability in extrapolationist defenses of that practice. I'll begin by identifying the kind of support bottle experiments might provide vis-à-vis hypotheses concerning natural systems. I'll then argue that the heterogeneity of ecological systems potentially undermines the significance of that support. I take this position to motivate further consideration of the epistemic value of bottle experiments: something I turn to in section 5.
Surrogates, according to extrapolationism, target natural systems, and the resemblance between them facilitates extrapolating results from the former to the latter 6 . Our ecologist notices that, under certain conditions, the two populations in her model oscillate, the prey lagging by a quarter-cycle. These dynamics result from the links between the equations representing prey and predators. The resemblance between the natural pattern and those generated by the model provide the basis for extrapolation: natural ecological systems exhibit the patterns they do because of the kinds of interactions captured by the model. Extrapolationism is, I think, a common view concerning bottle experiments. Jay Odenbaugh ([2006] ), for instance, suggests something like this:
… if ecologists can show that the differences between the artificial and natural systems are irrelevant and that the model of interest can accurately represent the dynamics of the former, then there is no reason to believe that it cannot do so with respect to the latter (728-729).
Bottle experiments are indeed informative of natural systems. However, I argue that extrapolationist defences of bottle experiments might not be sufficient alone. I should be explicit about the nature of my argument. We're here concerned with the pursuitworthiness of some investigative strategy 7 . That is, given that ecologists could adopt a range of strategies, what are the epistemic dividends we should expect from bottle experimentation, and are they sufficient to justify the practice? To answer such questions, we should get a grip on the expected epistemic goods generated by an investigation. This can then be balanced against its cost and difficulty, and thereby with competing strategies. Arguing that, on extrapolationist grounds, the epistemic returns from bottle experiments are potentially quite weak doesn't involve arguing that they do not provide such goods. Far from it. Rather, the discussion ought to motivate a richer picture of the epistemic goods bottle experiments provide, a task I'll turn to in section 5.
Ecological Possibility & Actuality
On an extrapolationist reading, Yoshida et al's investigation matters due to informing us as to whether cryptic dynamics can occur in natural systems. To see how, distinguish between ecological possibility and actuality. The space of ecological possibility concerns the dynamics and interactions described by ecological theory. Such theory is diverse, but for our purposes we could consider it as the modal space described by predator-prey models and reasonable extensions Although our microcosms are extremely simple systems, they mimic the consumerresource interactions in natural systems. Our rotifer-algal interaction is a herbivore consuming a primary producer… and our phage-bacterial interaction can be considered as either predator-prey or host-parasitoid (1876).
And so to our central question: if we expect different dynamics to generate the same patterns, and if our mathematical system expresses and explores these, what does actualizing them in a simplified experiment achieve?
The extrapolationist response is that demonstrating interactive dynamics like rapid evolution in experimental systems makes it plausible that such interactions are realized in natural systems.
Bottle experiments are an empirical mid-way point between mathematical and natural systems.
That is, demonstrating the actuality of the dynamics in a bottle experiment underwrites reasons for believing that they are actual in natural systems. The inference appears to be from the occurrence of dynamics in one area of ecological possibility space (artificial conditions) to their likely occurrence in a quite different part of that space (natural conditions). What might license such an inference? Although Yoshida et al emphasize the similarities between natural and artificial systems, their bottle experiment is specifically set up to mimic the theoretical dynamics that interest them. We might complain that it is unsurprising that the experiment behaved as it did: the circumstances were so constrained that the system had little choice (Crane & Molofsky
In typical experimental circumstances, we allow experimental subjects sufficient freedom to buck our expectations (Morgan [2005] ). Bottle-experiments, however, are so highly controlled that their behaving other than models predict is unlikely. This undermines the effectiveness of extrapolationism, as the new empirical information we gain vis-à-vis natural systems appears weak. It is possible, of course, that the experiments turn out to be unable to behave as models predict. In such circumstances, this might give us reason to think that the relevant mathematics cannot be realized. However, what is significant about realizing dynamics in an ideal physical system, for claiming that those dynamics also occur (or possibly occur) in complex, natural systems?
The answer appears to be that experimental results prove ecological actuality in a broad sense, and this is an empirical stepping-stone for showing they are realizable in natural systems.
If a scientist is unable to actualize the dynamics in question in a simple system then, the thinking goes, such dynamics are unlikely to occur in nature. If the scientist can, then, the hypothesis that the dynamics are possible passes an empirical test and is, prima-facie, more likely. Applied to the case at hand, Yoshida et al's experiments test whether it is possible to physically realize a system wherein trophic interactions are masked by fast-paced, cryptic dynamics. Because the two experimental systems (particularly the bacterial population, where morphs could be tracked) exhibit those dynamics, we have good reason to believe that cryptic evolution is ecologically actual-after all, we have an existence proof in the two experimental systems.
Ecological Heterogeneity
The extrapolationist defense of bottle experiments has vulnerabilities. Bottle experimentation is often hard: constructing and maintaining microcosm experiments, and getting them to behave as they do, is a significant achievement. But it is unclear whether demonstrating ecological actuality in an artificial system is epistemically significant on extrapolationist grounds. As we've seen, there is no direct extrapolation to be had from the artificial actuality to natural actuality. Rather, achieving artificial actuality gives some reason to think the dynamics are possible in natural systems. But the significance of even this can be questioned. The argument turns on the idea that a result's significance is sensitive to our priors concerning it. If we already expect a result, then the confirmatory dividends it brings are low. I want to suggest we have reason to think that a wide range of ecological dynamics are actual, and this to at least some extent undermines the epistemic value of demonstrating that particular dynamics are actual. Such an argument is not intended to show that extrapolationism is falsethat there are no such dividends. Rather, I will demonstrate that its effectiveness as a defense of the pursuitworthiness of bottle experiments is open to question, and this should thus motivate us to ask whether there is more that might be said regarding their epistemic value. The argument turns on the heterogeneity of ecological systems.
Ecological systems range over many types of critters, trophic levels, scales, and interaction strengths. This grants some reason to expect ecological actuality to cover a fair portion of ecological possibility. In ecology, constraints on possibility are surprising-what is actual is often less so. John Matthewson ([2011] ) has helpfully distinguished between 'complexity' and 'heterogeneity', and Alkistis Elliot-Graves ([2016] ) adapts this conceptual machinery to an ecological context where the behavior of natural systems matters crucially: invasion biology. In what follows, I'll draw on this work to explain why under some conditions our priors regarding the instantiation of many dynamics in natural ecological systems should be high.
Briefly, Matthewson's distinction turns on the number of parts and interactions in a system, and the types of parts within that system. The former is complexity: a system may be composed of a large number of differently interacting objects which are nonetheless homogenous. The latter is heterogeneity: a system may be composed of few parts, but they may be of different types. Matthewson's suggestion is that heterogeneity, not complexity, plays an important role in explaining the differing successes of disciplines such as physics and chemistry on the one hand, and ecology on the other. Both target complex systems-there are many components and they interact in various ways. But ecological systems are also heterogeneous. In physics, although there may be many electrons, and their interaction may be somewhat bewildering, by and large one electron can be a model for all 10 . Whereas in ecology, different predators, say, predate in different ways-and these differences matter. Elliott-Graves focuses on heterogeneity between systems: different tokens of system types may contain quite different components. Such heterogeneity undermines our capacity to take one system as a guide to others.
Across heterogeneous systems, we should expect a wide range of dynamics to be actual. A set of dynamics-those described by a predator-prey equation, for instance-are abstract. They will only apply across heterogeneous systems very coarsely. To describe how such systems will in fact behave, they must be supplemented by further detail
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. Which is to say, a different, more specific set of dynamics must be utilized. And so, we can move rather easily (perhaps even analytically) from a set of systems being heterogeneous, to their instantiating a wide range of dynamics. At the extreme end of the scale, we should expect that for any theoretically possible set of dynamics, those dynamics are ecologically realizable. This is surely a step too far: there are likely many constraints on what possible ecosystem dynamics can be actualized. However, the more causally heterogeneous we think a set of systems are, the more diverse we should expect the dynamics instantiated across those systems to be.
It is plausible that the significance of a result should turn on how surprising that result is, given our background knowledge. That is, if I already expect a result (for good reasons!), demonstrating the result is less significant than if the result was not expected. Significance is not 10 It's worth sounding a note of caution here, physical systems characterised as being 'simpler' than biological systems often turn out to be much more tricky than we imagined (see Havstad [forthcoming] on H20, for instance).
11 Elliott-Graves argues that this should be done via 'constrained integration', models of causal dynamics are filled in on a case-by-base basis.
determined by this feature alone: the domain of the result might matter very deeply to us (as it might in cases of high inductive risk), or it might be deeply embedded in a range of other theories. But regardless, significance and epistemic expectations are tightly knit.
If these points hold water, then we have the following argument. First, the heterogeneity of ecological systems gives good reason to expect many ecologically possible dynamics to be actual.
Second, the significance of demonstrating actuality is sensitive to our expectations about actuality; if we already expect a set of systems to exhibit a range of dynamics, demonstrating that a particular dynamic is actual is not very significant. Therefore-third-demonstrating the artificial ecological actuality of a dynamic is not so significant. However, fourth, extrapolationism argues that the pursuitworthiness of bottle experiments lies in their demonstrating the ecological actuality of some dynamic in an artificial system. Insofar as bottle experimentation is often a difficult, costly practice, then, we can conclude that fifth, if extrapolationism is our only option, then bottle experimentation's pursuitworthiness is in peril.
Theoretical modeling demonstrates the theoretical possibility of an ecological dynamic. We want to know whether this theoretical possibility is likely to be realized in a natural ecological system. The extrapolationist points to an artificial case, and argues this provides empirical grounds for expecting the same in natural systems. However, there is another route between ecological possibility and actuality: heterogeneity. Because we should already expect a wide variety of ecological dynamics to be realizable, the epistemic gap between possibility and natural actuality is not so wide. It doesn't follow from this that we will always be right: it could be that some areas of possibility are in fact very difficult to instantiate, and some apparent complexities common. However, it does suggest we shouldn't be particularly surprised if a particular set of dynamics are instantiated. This does not deny that demonstrations of ecological actuality in bottle experiments are epistemic achievements, however, such achievements are insignificant given our well-grounded expectations about natural ecological systems 12 .
This is by no means the end of the story vis-a-vis extrapolationism, as the success of the argument above turns on a major assumption. For heterogeneity to lead us to expect significant overlap between ecological possibility and actuality, we must have an idea of the scope of ecological possibility. If this is sufficiently large, then it is perfectly possible for sections to be Regardless, this argument puts pressure on extrapolationism about bottle experiments. That view relies on the value of taking artificial actuality as providing epistemic grounds for expecting natural actuality. But if we think the ecological world is highly diverse and heterogenous, in some circumstances we might see the step from ecological possibility to actuality as a short one. Under those circumstances, extrapolationism is weak. Happily, the epistemic benefits of bottle experiments are not exhausted by extrapolationism.
Understanding
Bottle-experiments are part of a wide range of investigative strategies: field observations and experiments, natural microcosm experiments, simulations, and so forth (Odenbaugh [2005] First, I'll sketch an account of understanding as an epistemic good. Second, I'll argue that bottle experiments are a genuinely good tool for generating understanding. Third, I'll discuss how understanding may be exported from the laboratory contexts in which it is generated.
The Epistemic Good of Understanding.
The thought underlying extrapolationism is that science is in the business of producing truth, or something like it-and truth understood along broadly correspondence terms. However, it is clear that science doesn't aim for that kind of truth alone. Indeed, it is plausible that there is a wide range of epistemic goods which science produces (Potochnik 2017 , 2013 , Chang 2012 . One set of plausible options is the production of understanding.
Philosophers disagree about the nature of understanding and its relationship to other epistemic goods, such as explanation and truth
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. At base, there is some relationship between knowing something is the case, and grasping that it is. A common theme, and one which suits me here, is to distinguish between understanding, explanation and truth by designating understanding as a kind of know-how. That is, where explanations and truths are primarily propositional, representing know-that; understanding is primarily a kind of ability. Knowing that cryptic dynamics can reproduce decoupled cycles despite strong trophic links is one thing, but knowing how they do so is another: the latter involves the capacity to be able to do something with that knowledge; the former with our capacity to represent it. Undoubtedly these kinds of knowledge are tightly-knit, and determining the relationship between them is tricky, but for my here. Her starting point is the oft-noticed tendency of scientific representations to misrepresent in profound ways. And this leads to an oft-tackled puzzle: many scientific goods, such as explanation, have close ties to the truth, and so how can they be provisioned via misrepresentation? One common response appeals to the heuristic value of such theories and models: they make it more likely that we'll get to the relevant truths (Odenbaugh [2005] suggests this in an ecological context). But such a response is unsatisfying: scientists don't appear to treat misrepresentations as a mere means; a stepping stone on the way to truth, rather, scientists often happily embrace a wide range of idealized, abstract apparent misrepresentations (Angela Potochnik [2017] On Le Bihan's schema, we can analyze this modal understanding in terms of a possibility space S generated by a phenomenon's domain, P, and the dependency structures which determine subsets of P to be the case within S. For the case at hand, let's take our phenomenon domain to be circumstances involving tight trophic coupling. In some subset of that domain, coupling will correlate with the kinds of dynamics which observation techniques detect: well behaved predator-prey cycles, for instance. In others, coupling will correlate with cryptic cycles;
where observation techniques will fail to detect trophic coupling. There are a series of dependency relationships governing under what circumstances trophic interactions will generate different cycles. The modal space, then, consists of:
S, a possibility space; P, the domain of S in which tropic interaction takes place.
P1, the subset of P where trophic interaction generates well-behaved dynamics;
P2, the subset of P where trophic interaction generates cryptic dynamics;
A set of dependency structures concerning S, which determine whether P holds, or whether P1
or P2 hold 14 .
What, then is it to have modal understanding of P for Le Bihan?
Constitutive of modal understanding is the possession of "… 'navigating skills': the ability to 'navigate' (some of) the possibility space for some domain of phenomena P" (117). Le Bihan identifies various levels of know-how relating to navigation: first, how dependency structures generate P (that is, modal knowledge of the dependency structures), second, how different dependency relations interrelate (that is, modal knowledge of P), and third, understanding global constraints on S (see figure 3 ). In combination, these different modal abilities allow us to navigate within particular dependency structures, consider how they'll interact in different contexts, and grasp the general features necessary for P. We can clothe this abstract schema by considering Matthewson's intra-system sense, and Elliott-Graves' inter-system sense), then we should expect much of the ecological world to not be amenable to observation techniques.
On such a view, then, some scientific investigations have epistemic (rather than merely heuristic) value in virtue of providing understanding, here understood as modal navigating capabilities. In the next section, I'll argue that bottle experiments are particularly well-placed to "… provide us with some understanding of the phenomena by providing us with some knowledge of how to navigate the possibility space" (122).
Bottle Experiments as Understanding-Generators.
Let's take stock. I've thus far provided a case-study to ground our discussion of the merits of bottle-experiments. There, Yoshida et al triangulated between two experimental systems and a simple model to explore cryptic dynamics in ecology. They took their results to cause trouble for observational techniques: the practice of inferring trophic interactions from observed population dynamics. The view I've called 'extrapolationism' takes the epistemic value of bottle experiments to lie in demonstrating ecological actuality in an artificial system. That is, by generating cryptic dynamics in a controlled experiment, the hypothesis that they might be instantiated in a natural system passes a test. However, I have argued that the heterogeneity of ecological systems should lead us to expect ecological actuality to be broad and diverse, and thus we should expect significant overlap between ecological possibility and ecological actuality. Although that argument requires significant assumptions, I think it shows that a purely extrapolationist defense of bottle experimentation is limited.
I've just zeroed in on an epistemic good that I'll argue bottle experiments are apt for generating: the know-how involved with modal-navigation. It's worth noting that given the heterogeneity of ecological systems, such know-how is both particularly hard-won, and extremely valuable. Making sense of how various ecological dynamics might be instantiated in a range of circumstances-what dependency structures there are and how they might be interrelated-is precisely the kind of knowledge we need to explain the behavior of these tricky systems. So, why might we think that bottle-experiments are particularly suitable for this task? To see this, let's briefly consider how we gain know-how of the sort concerning us here.
Learning how to navigate modal spaces involves concretizing those spaces. By 'concretizing', I do not necessarily mean making physical, but rather making explicit. We start from a set of rather abstract ideas and assumptions. For instance, echoing earlier in the discussion, we might think that it is plausible that different trophic interactions and population structures might underdetermine patterns in ecological systems. But seeing how these ideas and assumptions play out in a domain requires that we specify them in more detail. We need a way of representing, specifying-concretizing-those assumptions. For instance, a coupled differential equation is one way of representing a set of assumptions about the causal interactions between trophic levels.
Positing such an equation sets a particular modal domain, and allows us to explore it. That is, it underwrites our learning how to navigate the domain specified by the equations. We see the same in bottle experiments. But-crucially-the mediums are different, the way we specify our assumptions are different, and both the modal domains, and the way we explore and navigate these domains are different: thus, I argue, different understandings are generated.
Another way of putting this point is to see that the construction and running of bottle experiments involve a different set of constraints than observing natural phenomena and running field experiments on the one hand, and using theoretical models and simulations on the other.
Bottle experiments provide a set of constraints which make them well-suited to generating understanding of ecological dynamics. To demonstrate this, I'll briefly contrast bottle experiments with studies of naturally occurring systems and with mathematical models. Briefly, whereas bottle experiments are both simpler and more manipulable than natural systems, they are (in some relevant sense) more constrained than mathematical models. And these divergences facilitate the generation of rich knowledge about the dependencies involved in ecological dynamics.
Recall that I'm drawing on a notion of understanding where it consists in having the capacity to navigate a possibility space pertaining to some domain on the basis of understanding various dependencies within those spaces. The possibility spaces pertaining to ecology are wide indeed, and understanding them involves various approaches and strategies. Bottle experimentation is one such strategy. They are not the only strategy -indeed, the exploration of natural systems and theoretical systems are also required. But when we compare these, the 'sweet spot' bottle experiments occupy becomes clear.
Bottled systems are simpler than natural systems. Where natural systems instantiate a wide range-a chaos-of causal interactions which often require long periods of data collection to begin to unpick, bottle experiments are highly simplified, easily graspable systems. This allows two things. First, the relevant dependency relations are laid bare in clear, accessible ways.
Consider the relationship between population structures in prey and cryptic cycles. In the bacteria-phage bottle system, because it is possible to mark the phage-resistant bacteria, we can track the compensation between toughs and softs within the bacterial population, as well as the relationship between it and the phage population. Doing the same in a wild population would be extremely tricky, both in terms of scale and causal heterogeneity: small scale allows the dynamics to unfold before our eyes, causal homogeneity allows us to identify much more precisely the dependencies governing the system's behavior.
Second, these dependencies are manipulable. As Yoshida et al could vary when to introduce predators to the experiment, they could run tests of their theory on the algae-rotifer system which asked after the dependencies posited in their hypothesis. As we saw above, cryptic population dynamics predict that an unpredated prey population should become dominated by softs, and upon the introduction of predators should switch to normal predator-prey oscillations, before exhibiting cryptic dynamics once tough numbers have increased sufficiently. Although some control is possible in natural systems, this is much amped up in the lab. The combination of tractability and manipubility make bottle experiments far preferable to natural systems for learning how to navigate ecological space. Where nature's heterogeneity will swamp and hide the relevant dependency relationships, bottle experiments lay them out.
These features-simplicity and manipubility-are shared between bottle experiments and formal models-particularly simulations studies -and so, why use bottle experiments as opposed to computer-run models? The answer is that the two systems complement one another. . As a particular model is just one way of concretizing a modal space, we want to know whether dynamics are similar across different models which pick out similar spaces in different ways. Concretizing the dynamics by using a differential equation as well as in the experimental system suggests that the results are not simply due to a quirk in the particular system -a quirk in that particular concretization exercise -but is a common features of ecological spaces. The ways in which bottle experiment behavior and theoretical model behavior converge, then, inform us about the resilience of the dependencies across the relevant modal spaces.
Second, the simple physicality of the bottle experiment leads to the exploration of a subtly different area of possibility space and a different set of dependencies. Different access, different properties, and different mediums guide the scientists in exploring different modal spaces in differing ways. Although switching from simple differential equations to, say, an agent-based simulation is a sizable departure, switching to a physical system involving living critters is much more radical. In short, concretizing a modal space in multiple ways is crucial for understanding, and the physicality of bottle experiments provide a quite different way of concretizing when compared to theoretical systems.
None of this says that the knowledge bottle experiments provide are unique in principle, but regardless I think such considerations make it plausible that they are an excellent way of gaining the know-how required to navigate ecological space. It also paints a picture of ecology in an abstract, non-extrapolationist key: ecological knowledge is of ecological dynamics generally speaking (rather than merely their instantiation in natural systems) and of the assumptions underlying observational techniques and other empirical tools. This suggests that my construal of ecology in section 2-as concerned narrowly with explaining patterns in natural ecosystems by positing connections between populations-was far too quick. Ecologists are also interested in theoretical questions about ecological dynamics which need not bear on natural systems.
To clarify the position, let's pause and contrast it with Griesemer & Wade's (1988) view on 'experimental evolution', which is readily adapted to ecological cases. They are primarily interested in how species selection can be understood generally by being realized in microcosms.
Griesemer & Wade use a version of the 'vera causa ideal' to frame their discussion (for more recent investigation, see Novick [2016] , Novick & Scholl [forthcoming] ). The principle is a set of conditions governing when causal explanations are complete or successful. For a putative cause to be vera causa, we must establish (1) the 'competence' of the cause: if it were to occur, then the explanandum would follow; (2) the 'reality' of the cause-we should find evidence of it occurring in contexts beyond the explanandum case. Yoshida et al's work can be adapted fairly easily: they are interested in whether cryptic population structure might explain some patterns of population abundance. By realizing these dynamics in an experimental system they show that such structures may produce such dynamics (competence), and do so independently of the examples which motivated their investigation (reality Indeed, if we delineate the experimental and the theoretical in terms of their epistemic outputs, and some practices have multiple such outputs, then the value of that way of distinguishing between modeling and experiment might be limited when applied to those practices (however, we shouldn't take the existence of indeterminate cases as alone undermining such distinctions!).
Experimental systems aid in nature-directed and more theoretical pursuits in virtue of occupying a sweet-spot in the generation of understanding. As physical systems, bottle experiments can guide and inspire theorizing, and generate empirical data, which mathematical models cannot. Because they are simple and controlled, they are more casually transparent and amenable to study than natural systems. This makes them superb tools for exploring the nature of ecological dynamics and the assumptions underlying ecological theory. Even when truths about natural systems are not in the offing, grasping these other aspects of ecology pays significant epistemic dividends.
How Understanding Travels.
An objection: the dissemination of scientific knowledge is not produced via running experiments, but by publishing experimental results. If the epistemic good at hand is primarily an ability, how can the mere reporting of experimental procedures and their outcomes generate know-how? Happily, Sabina Leonelli ([2016] ) has recently discussed a similar question, and I'll sketch and co-opt her answer.
Leonelli asks how the bountiful data generated by experimental model organism work are disseminated via databases; that is, how data travels from the context of its generation to other domains. On her view, database practices involve (1) using categorization to decontextualize data from the idiosyncrasies of origin; and then (2) facilitating recontextualization for use in new circumstances. For Leonelli, two things are necessary for recontextualization to succeed. First, meta-data must record information about the data's origin and subsequent travel, such that it can be made sense of and critically appraised by scientists. And second, those scientists must possess the relevant embodied knowledge in virtue of having, for instance, run similar studies to those from which the data emerged. On Leonelli's view, data journeys require both good recording practices, and the audience having the relevant expertise. In the good case, because the audience-the scientists utilizing the data base-have themselves had the relevant experience necessary to understand, criticize, and utilize the data, they are able to successfully reuse the data in new contexts.
Although the high-throughput biological cases Leonelli analyses are significantly more developed in terms of recording practices-a single publication is no data-base!-the same basic ideas are applicable here. Even if it is in virtue of being involved with the design, set-up and running-of experiments that Yoshida et al have generated the epistemic good, it doesn't follow from this that those goods cannot be transported via publication. As Leonelli makes explicit, the capacity to travel depends in part on the audience's knowledge. Ecologists undergo quite different types of training: some focus more on mathematical modeling, others on fieldwork, and others on the experimental work that concerns us here. But regardless, there is significant overlap. This overlap enables them to make sense of, and to learn the lessons of, Yoshida et al's work. Moreover, the diversity of the different training allows ecologists to draw lessons from the paper which Yoshida et al themselves might not be able to see: the plurality of embodied knowledge throughout ecology allows ecologists to draw different aspects from a single study.
Conclusion
I've argued that the vindication of ecological bottle experiments lies in their capacity to generate understanding of ecological dynamics as well as their capacity to generate truths about natural systems. Generally speaking understanding and truth are not independent, nor mutually exclusive. A defense of the pursuitability of bottle experiments, then, may draw on both.
I have focused on how bottle-experimentation in ecology promotes ecological understanding. But this vindication might be particularly strong when the experiments play dual roles: acting as empirical bridges between theory and the natural world as well as generating modal understanding. Indeed, given the heterogeneity of ecological systems, good expectations about the modal nature of the ecological world-good modal navigation skills-are likely a prerequisite for making meaningful empirical contact with them. We musn't relieve ourselves of both baby and bathwater by decoupling experiment and nature too quickly: natural phenomena still matter. Indeed, it is plausible that an understanding of ecological dynamics will themselves help us in our empirical investigations of complex and heterogeneous natural systems. Yoshida et al posit a set of dependencies governing cryptic dynamics generally speaking-these could potentially form the basis of more direct investigations involving ecological systems in play.
Even in circumstances where experimentation's capacity inform us about natural ecological systems is limited, such studies are often well placed to provide other epistemic goods-as I have suggested, to develop the capacities required to understand ecological dynamics and the assumptions underlying their epistemic tools. Bottle experiments generate understanding.
